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The Japanese aircraft industry, which was of very small scale before World War II, 
became Japan’s largest manufacturing industry by the end of the war. In this paper, 
we explore the basis for the growth of the aircraft industry during this time by 
focusing on the No. 5 Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. It was revealed that 
during the war, the supply of basic inputs increased substantially: the labor force and 
“machinery parts” were in sufficient supply and neither was a binding constraint on 
production. The binding constraint existed in the supply of “special parts.” Put 
differently, aircraft production expanded as the supply of special parts increased. 
This increase in the supply of special parts and still faster growth in the supply of 
machinery parts came about through the expansion of the supplier network in terms 
of both the number of suppliers and the geographical area in which they were located. 
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 1. Introduction 
The Japanese aircraft industry, which was of a very small scale before World War II, 
became a huge industry employing 1.5 million workers by the end of the war. Such 
rapid growth has attracted interest since at least just after the war, and many 
important studies have been undertaken. Among others, the “Final Reports of the 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)” (hereafter, “Final Reports”) and 
Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction by Jerome B. Cohen (a member of the 
USSBS) discussed the structure of the Japanese war economy in detail, drawing on 
thorough investigations obtained through the authority of the postwar occupation 
forces. Both studies are still worth referring to as providing the basic literature on 
the Japanese war economy, including the aircraft industry. 
One of the most important contributions of the former is that it initially 
presented the view that aircraft production in Japan depended on parts supply from 
numerous small-sized suppliers. For instance, the report states that, “…a 
considerable percentage of airframe and engine subassembly manufacturing was let 
out to subcontractors, a high percentage of parts came from a large network of sub-
subcontractors,” and “shops scattered throughout the industrial areas supplied the 
thousands of bits and pieces that made up the finished aircraft.”1 Many subsequent 
studies on the Japanese war economy have accepted and extended this viewpoint. 
For example, in an article focusing on the policy of the Japanese government and the 
military authorities, Shiro Yamazaki detailed the percentage of parts let out to the 
outside suppliers and discussed the problems in managing these suppliers, using 
documents from the Administration Inspection Mission, which inspected Nakajima 
Aircraft in September and October 1943.2 
Hirofumi Ueda analyzed the lists of “cooperative factories,” and concluded that, 
despite government policy to strengthen and put in order the relationships between 
assemblers and suppliers, the relationships were discontinuous and in a mess.3 
Further, as the wartime aircraft industry was pioneering the mass production system 
in Japan, there are many other studies on the aircraft industry from the standpoint 
of production management. This literature, including research by Yasutaka 
Takahashi, Kazuo Wada, Satoshi Sasaki, Yuko Maeda, and Masanao Kasai,4 has also 
focused on parts suppliers as the basis of the mass production system. The key 
implication is that wartime production in Japan comprised an extensive division of 
work between firms and outsourcing. This is important because recent work revealed 
that this feature was not unique to Japan. For example, a recent work by Lutz 
Budrass and coauthors found that labor productivity increased substantially during 
World War II and that it was mainly because of outsourcing combined with learning-
by-doing5. 
However, in the context of Japan, much still remains unexplored. One 
interesting area is the function of the supplier networks. A shortcoming of the 
existing literature is that it heavily relies on documents associated with the 
Administration Inspection Mission in September and October 1943. Hence, the 
information concentrates on what the members of the mission observed during these 
particular months. It is then desirable to examine the function of supplier networks 
                                                  
1 USSBS, “Final Reports,” Aircraft Division, p. 23. Similar findings are found in 
Cohen’s study (p. 221). Toyo Keizai Shinposha eds., Showa Sangyoshi also writes, “As 
the aircraft industry was a highly synthetic industry and it was requested a sharp 
production increase in a short period, each aircraft firm rapidly increased to the 
extent let out to the outside suppliers, while expanding its own equipment” (p. 620). 
2 Yamazaki, “Taiheiyo Senso Kohanki.” 
3 Ueda, Senjiki. 
4 Takahashi, Nakajima Hikoki; Wada, “Nihon”; Sasaki, Kagakuteki Kanri; Maeda, 
Senjiki; Kasai, “Senjika” 
5 Budrass et al., “Fixed Price.” from a longer term as well as a quantitative perspective. Fortunately, the archives of 
the Nagoya Aircraft Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Co. hold documents that 
were prepared for the USSBS immediately after the war. These documents provide 
rich information on aircraft production and the parts supply of Nagoya Aircraft 
Works from 1939 to 1945, information not fully utilized by the “Final Reports” of the 
USSBS. In this paper, we examine the expansion of the supplier network, the parts 
supply from the network, and the relationship between parts supply and aircraft 
production in wartime Japan by focusing on the Nagoya Aircraft Works of Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of aircraft 
production and the relevant policies of the Japanese government and the military 
authorities during the war. Section 3 describes the expansion of Nagoya Works and 
its supplier network. In Section 4, we analyze the relationship between the parts 
supply and aircraft production. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Expansion of the aircraft industry 
As shown in Figure 1, one of the remarkable features of the Japanese economy 
during World War II is the rapid growth of the machinery industry. As the Census of 
Manufactures is not available after 1943, we estimated the number of employees in 
the machinery industry and in the manufacturing industry as a whole for 1943 and 
1944 using the manufacturing production index compiled by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) after the war. According to our estimates, 
employment in the manufacturing industry in 1944 was about 2.5 million, five times 
larger than in 1936 when the war with China began. Consequently, the machinery 
industry came to be the largest sector of all manufacturing industries. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 1, its share of manufacturing industry employment rose from 18.0% 
in 1936 to 54.1% in 1944. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
This rapid growth of the machinery industry mainly reflects the expansion of 
the aircraft industry. Table 1 provides the estimated production share of the aircraft 
industry. We estimated the production of the aircraft industry using the data on 
airframe and engine production in the “Final Reports” of the USSBS and unit price 
data from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. We extrapolated the production of the 
machinery industry in 1943 and 1944 using the MITI manufacturing production 
index and the Bank of Japan’s wholesale price index. According to Table 1, the share 
of manufacturing industry production held by the aircraft industry increased from 
8.2% in 1941 to 33.9% in 1944. It is also notable that the production share of the 
aircraft industry increased sharply in an industry that, at the time, was also 
exhibiting rapid growth. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Until the early 1930s, the Japanese aircraft industry was very small, annually 
producing only 100–200 planes. However, in 1944, the year before the end of the war, 
it was producing some 24,000 aircraft. Figure 2 shows the monthly time series of 
Japanese airframe production. We can discern several phases in this time series. 
First, while the increase in production was very slow until the early 1930s, it 
accelerated starting in 1937. Second, following the slowdown of the increase in 
production from 1939 to 1941, production growth again accelerated, and we can 
identify two further accelerations in about September 1942 and September 1943. 
Third, from April 1944, the increase in production again slowed, and finally from 
October 1944, a declining production phase began. These phases in airframe 
production reflect the conduct of the war and the policies of the Japanese government and the military authorities.6 For the remainder of this section, we overview these 
production phases by focusing on these policies. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
When the Sino–Japanese War broke out, the Army put into action the First and 
Second Munitions Mobilizations in 1937 and 1938, respectively. In these action plans, 
the respective targets for annual aircraft production were set at 1,533 and 2,652, 
while actual aircraft production in 1936 was only 305. To achieve the rapid 
production increase required, the Army made “The First and Second Requests for 
Production Capacity Expansion,” whose targets were 3,960 airframes by March 1939 
and 5,460 airframes by September 1939. 7  Then in December 1939, the Army 
requested aircraft producers to again expand the production capacity of airframes to 
6,816 by September 1941. 8  Meanwhile, in November 1938, the Navy requested 
producers to expand the production capacity of airframes to 3,024 by March 1940.9 
The sharp increase in airframe production from 1937 shown in Figure 2 reflects 
these measures taken by the Japanese Army and Navy. 
The year 1941 was one of the major turning points of the Japanese war economy. 
The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941 
substantially changed the strategic prospects for the Japanese Army. Given the 
weakening of the military threat from the Soviet Union to the north, the Army 
decided to invade the southern part of Indochina to cut off the aid route from the U.S. 
and the U.K. to the Chinese government. This invasion invoked a strong reaction by 
the U.S. and the U.K., and culminated in the freezing of Japanese oversea assets. In 
a situation where the probability of war with the U.S. and the U.K. was increasing, 
the Japanese military authorities accelerated their policy for expanding the 
munitions industries, particularly the aircraft industry. In September 1941, the 
Army determined the “Outline of the Revised Munitions Mobilization Plan,” where 
the target for airframe production in 1941 was set at 4,809.10 The Navy also issued 
instructions for the “Second Production Capacity Expansion Plan” to aircraft 
producers in April 1941, which aimed at expanding the production capacity of 
airframes to 5,412 by the end of 1942.11  As shown in Figure 2, the acceleration of 
airframe production in 1941 reflects the broader events of that year. 
The outbreak of war between Japan and the U.S. and the U.K. in December 
1941 announced a new epoch in the Japanese war economy. The “Final Reports” of 
the USSBS states, “…the real expansion, the ‘all-out’ national effort, came during the 
war years, 1942 to 1944,” after highlighting the increase in aircraft production from 
1936 to 1941.12 In early 1942, the Army instructed Japanese aircraft producers to 
produce 6,300 aircraft in 1942, and at the conference on the munitions mobilization 
of the Army, the Minister of the Army, Hideki Tojo, announced that priority should be 
given to aircraft in the mobilization.13 The Navy also stressed the policy of giving 
                                                  
6 The constitution of prewar Japan included a clause stating that the Emperor 
directly controlled the Army and Navy. Especially after the 1930s, this clause was 
widely interpreted to mean that the Army and Navy were independent of the civilian 
government. 
7 National Institutes for Defense Studies, Rikugun Koku Heiki, pp. 200–202. 
8 Ibid, p. 254. 
9 Editorial Committee of the History of the Japan Navy Air Force ed., Nihon Kaigun, 
p. 328. The deadline was later postponed until March 1941. 
10 National Institutes for Defense Studies, Rikugun Koku Heiki, pp. 263–265. 
11 Editorial Committee of the History of the Japan Navy Air Force ed., Nihon Kaigun, 
pp. 335–336. 
12 USSBS, “Final Reports,” p. 1. 
13 National Institutes for Defense Studies, Rikugun Koku Heiki, p. 326. priority to aircraft production as a result of the performance of the air force in the 
early stages of the war with the U.S. and the U.K., notwithstanding making up for 
the losses of aircraft from the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. In August 1942, 
the Navy announced the Third Production Capacity Expansion Plan to aircraft 
producers, which aimed at expanding the production capacity of airframes to 11,610 
by March 1946.14  Meanwhile, the government determined a policy to concentrate 
resources on the “Five Priority Industries”: namely, iron and steel, aluminum, coal, 
ships and aircraft.15 
However, it was not until September 1943 that an “all-out national effort” in its 
narrowest sense was made for aircraft production. To cope with the deteriorating war 
situation, the Japanese military authorities and the government placed their last 
hopes on the increase in aircraft production. In September 1943, the Conference in 
the Presence of the Emperor by the Army and Navy and the government determined 
“The Outline of the Future War Management,” which promoted the strategy of 
rapidly expanding the air force while defending the “Absolute Defense Sphere,” 
namely, the area inside the Chishima Islands, Ogasawara Islands, New Guinea, Java, 
Sumatra, and Burma. Based on this strategy, the Conference set the target for 
aircraft production in 1944 for the Army and Navy to be 40,000, more than double 
the aircraft production of 1943. To achieve this target, the government and the Army 
and Navy went to great efforts, including the reform of government organization. 
To begin with, in September and October 1943, the Cabinet dispatched the 
Administration Inspection Mission headed by Ginjiro Fujiwara, the Consultant of the 
Cabinet and a powerful man in the business society, to major aircraft factories. This 
is significant in the sense that the government now started to concentrate the 
authorities relating to aircraft production hitherto dispersed across many ministries. 
The mission concluded that it was indeed possible to produce the 40,000 aircraft 
required, and that with appropriate measures, the production of up to 50,000 aircraft 
was feasible. The mission also argued that it was essential to reform the 
administrative system of aircraft production to remove the harmful effects of the 
conflict between the Army and the Navy.16 
The administrative reforms advised by the Fujiwara Mission took form with the 
foundation of the Ministry of Munitions in November 1943. The Ministry of 
Munitions integrated the administrative functions for aircraft production in the 
Army Air Headquarters and the Naval Air Headquarters, all functions of the 
Planning Board, and the functions on munitions production in the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. In this sense, the Ministry of Munitions became the 
ministry in charge of all issues concerning munitions production and distribution. 
The aircraft production plan for 1944, the first plan drawn up by the Ministry of 
Munitions, set the aircraft production target to be 52,500, of which 27,120 aircraft 
were for the Army and 25,380 aircraft for the Navy.17 
However, the environment of the Japanese war economy continued to 
deteriorate after the foundation of the Ministry of Munitions. From February 1944 to 
April 1944, the Army and Navy requisitioned additional ships every month, a process 
that damaged the production of aluminum. In June 1944, U.S. forces landed on 
Saipan, signifying the breaking of “The Absolute Defense Sphere.” After that, Japan 
continued to lose ships and abandon ship routes because of attacks by U.S. forces. 
From November 1944, B-29s based at Saipan conducted the strategic bombing of 
                                                  
14 National Institutes for Defense Studies, Kaigun Koku, pp. 281–282; Editorial 
Committee of the History of the Japan Navy Air Force ed., Nihon Kaigun, p. 339. 
15 Hara, “Senji Tosei”; Hara “Taiheiyo Senso”; Yamazaki, “Taiheiyo Senso Ki”; 
Okazaki, “Nihon.” 
16 Hara, “Senji Tosei”; Yamazaki, “Taiheiyo Senso”; Yamzaki, “Taiheiyo Senso 
Kohanki.” 
17 Yamazaki, “Taiheiyo Senso Kohanki.” Japan,18 the main targets being the aircraft industry. The strategic bombing and the 
associated factory evacuations provided the final assault on Japanese aircraft 
production, which as shown in Figure 2 had already started to decline from October 
1944.19 
 
3. Production capacity expansion of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. and its supplier 
network 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. (MHI) was one of the largest aircraft producers in 
wartime Japan. Mitsubishi Zaibatsu entered the aircraft industry when it founded 
Mitsubishi Internal Combustion Engine Co. (MICE) in Nagoya in 1920. Mitsubishi 
originally intended to produce aircraft and automobiles at MICE, but gradually 
MICE began to focused on aircraft, and in 1928 was renamed Mitsubishi Aircraft Co. 
In 1934, Mitsubishi Aircraft Co. and Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co. merged to become 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co., with Nagoya Aircraft Works (NAW) becoming the 
center for aircraft production.20 
The expansion of the aircraft industry described in the previous section greatly 
influenced the NAW, as both the Army and the Navy expected it to bear a substantial 
portion of the expansion plan and correspondingly ordered many aircraft. With 
respect to The First and Second Production Capacity Expansion Requests of the 
Army in 1938, the expectation was that MHI would produce 480 and 660 airframes of 
the total 3,960 and 5,460 airframes, respectively. With respect to The Third 
Production Capacity Expansion Request of the Army in 1939, it was expected MHI 
would produce 1,296 of the total 6,816 airframes. Meanwhile, with respect to The 
First Production Capacity Expansion Plan the Navy in 1938, MHI was to produce 
900 of the 3,024 total airframes.21 
Table 2 shows the number of airframe orders for and the production of MHI. 
Table 2 clearly indicates that orders from the Army and the Navy increased sharply 
in 1937 and again in 1938. On August 1 1937, just after the breakout of the Sino–
Japanese War, the Navy instructed MHI to increase production sharply, and held a 
conference attended by all major aircraft producers at the NAW calling for an 
increase in production. The “Summary History of Nagoya Works” observes that, in 
response to this conference, the works began to rapidly expand production as an 
emergency measure.”22 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The number of workers at the NAW reflected the increase in production from 
1937, and equipment began to increase in 1938 when MHI received instruction from 
the Army and Navy to expand its production capacity (Table 3). In 1938, MHI moved 
the engine plant of the NAW and made it an independent establishment, Nagoya 
Engine Works, while the NAW became specialized in airframe production. At the 
same time, the airframe plant was reorganized. All of the existing airframe plants 
were then assigned to naval airframes, and a new plant for army airframes was 
constructed.23 
                                                  
18 Hara, “Senji Tosei.” 
19 The USSBS evaluation stated: “During the dismantling of plants and the moving 
and reestablishment of production lines, the loss in production was greater than that 
because of direct air attacks” (“Final Reports,” p. 3). 
20 MHI, “Mitsubishi Jukogyo,” p. 294; Maeda, “Senjiki,” pp. 50–53. 
21 National Institutes for Defense Studies, Rikugun Koku Heiki, p. 202, p. 254; 
Editorial Committee of the History of the Japan Navy Air Force ed., Nihon Kaigun, 
pp. 335–336. 
22 The page on August 1, 1937 of “Mitsubishi Kokuki Seisakujo Gaishi” (held at the 
23 MHI, Mitsubishi Jukogyo, p. 297. As stated in the previous section, the Army and the Navy instructed the major 
aircraft producers to expand their production capacity in September 1941 and April 
1941, respectively. Upon receiving these instructions, MHI newly established the 
Kumamoto Works for Army airframes and the Okayama Works for Naval airframes, 
both away from the Nagoya area.24 Meanwhile, the NAW continued to expand.25 By 
comparing the scale of the NAW at the end of 1936 and the end of 1943, we can see 
that it was 7.0, 11.8 and 15.9 times larger in terms of floor space, the number of 




In December 1944, the NAW suffered from two seriously damaging incidents: a 
major earthquake and U.S. bombing. Given the scale of the damage, the NAW 
evacuated its plants to avoid any future bombing. The NAW plants were evacuated to 
many geographic areas, including Nagano, Toyama, Shizuoka, Shiga, Mie, and Fukui. 
To manage these dispersed plants, the NAW was then divided into four separate 
establishments, namely No. 1, No. 2, No. 5, and No. 11 Works.26 
An increase of parts supply should accompany the expansion of airframe 
production capacity. While the Nagoya Engine Works inside MHI supplied the 
engines, the most important part of an aircraft so to speak, the NAW relied on a 
number of outside suppliers for the various other aircraft parts.27 For instance, the 
“Final Reports” on the USSBS details that MHI let out 32% of its work on aircraft 
production to subcontractors.28 The NAW undertook some efforts to find and manage 
its subcontractors when the expansion of production capacity began. For example, 
the “Chronological Table of the Factory” prepared by the NAW29 details “As the need 
to utilize subcontractors became more and more immediate, we set up a branch office 
with stationed staff in Osaka, in order to find subcontractors and then supervise 
their work. Afterwards, we also stationed staff in Tokyo.”30 Because the document 
was written in April 1940, we can say that by this time the NAW had stationed staff 
to find and manage subcontractors in both Tokyo and Osaka. 
In terms of the NAW department responsible for the Army airframes, detailed 
data on parts suppliers are available. In December 1944, the Army airframe 
department was reorganized into No. 5 Works, and this subsequently produced a 
document titled “Factory Survey” in October 1945 to file with the USSBS.31 This 
document contains rich data on the Army airframe section of the NAW from 1939. 
Concerning the period before December 1944, the data are for the No. 2 Processing 
Department of the NAW, but in the subsequent part of the paper, we refer to No. 2 
Processing Department as No. 5 Works for simplicity. The “Factory Survey” contains 
a list of suppliers and their locations by parts categories, namely “special parts,” 
“machinery parts,” “castings and forgings,” “metal sheet processing,” “material,” 
                                                  
24 NAW, “Genkyo Shinkokusho,” Match 1943 (held at the NAW archives). 
25 Ibid. 
26 MHI, Mitsubishi Jukogyo, p. 298, pp. 350–351. 
27 Of the 13 aircraft producers in Japan, six major producers produced engines as 
well as airframes, including Mitsubishi and Nakajima (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 
Showa, p. 606. Concerning, Nagoya Engine Works of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
Co., see Maeda, Senjiki. 
28 USSBS, “Final Reports,” p. 28. For other aircraft producers, the ratios were 43% 
for Nakajima Aircraft Co. and 31% for Aichi Aircraft Co. See also Toyo Keizai 
Shinposha, Showa, p. 621. 
29 Held at the NAW archives. 
30 NAW, “Kojo Genkyo Hokoku, Kojo Enkaku Nenpyo,” April 1940 (held at the NAW 
archives), p. 10. 
31 Held at the NAW archives. “material processing,” and “lumber.” The numbers of suppliers in the list are, by 
parts category, 83, 115, 30, 24, 73, 10, and 13, respectively. Furthermore, with respect 
to “special parts,” “machinery parts,” and “castings and forgings,” data on the year 
when each supplier started to supply parts to No. 5 Works and the year when it 
ceased supply are also available. 
In terms of the categories of parts, special parts include bearings, electric parts, 
and springs, and many large firms, including Fujikoshi Steel Co. (bearings), NSK Co. 
(bearings), Mitsubishi Electric Co. (electric parts), Tokyo Shibaura Electric Co. 
(electric parts) and Chuo Spring Co. (springs) are included in the list as suppliers for 
the No. 5 Works. However, machinery parts generally comprise miscellaneous items 
such as “small parts,” “large parts,” and “kind of stopcocks,” and few large firms are 
included in the list. Further, we consider that the special parts and machinery parts 
in this document correspond to the official categories of parts, namely “special 
technical parts” and “general parts.” Special technical parts are then further 
classified into “controlled parts,” “government-coordinated parts,” and “government-
supplied parts.” While controlled parts were produced under government supervision, 
orders and distribution were directly between assemblers and suppliers. With 
government-coordinated parts, the government gave orders to suppliers, which then 
delivered the ordered parts to the assemblers. Finally, with respect to government-
supplied parts, the government purchased these to deliver to the assemblers itself.32 
In sum, the government was directly involved in the production and/or distribution of 
special technical parts in at least some way. 
Using the “Factory Survey,” Masanao Kasai pointed out that the years when 
suppliers started to supply parts were concentrated in 1938–1939 for special parts 
and 1941–1944 for machinery parts, and the increase in suppliers corresponds to the 
introduction of the tact system at the NAW.33 However, Kasai focused on the starting 
years of parts supply. By using information on the end years along with the start 
years, we can discern the list of suppliers for each year. 
Table 4 provides the number of suppliers for No. 5 Works by parts category. As 
shown, the number of suppliers increased sharply in 1939 and again in 1943–1944. 
Importantly, the suppliers of special and machinery parts increased sharply in 1939. 
In 1943–44, suppliers of castings and forgings increased sharply alongside special 
and machinery parts. These changes in the number of suppliers are approximately 
associated with the orders and production of Army airframes in Table 2. Indeed, the 
sharpest increase in orders took place in 1938 and 1943.34 For instance, the “Factory 
Survey” concludes, “(From late 1942 to 1943) we began an epoch-making expansion. 
This is a period of finding and fostering cooperative factories35 entering the aircraft 
parts industry from other industries. During this period, production capacity 
substantially increased.” Together, this suggests that No. 5 Works strategically found 
and fostered suppliers as a part of its expansion in production capacity. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Using the supplier list, we can observe the stability of the transaction 
relationships between No. 5 Works and its suppliers. For example, of the 83 suppliers 
of special parts on the list, only 13 disappeared before 1945, while of the 115 
                                                  
32 Final Reports of the USSBS, p. 13. 
33 Kasai, “Senjika,” p. 104. Concerning the tact system at Mitsubishi Engine Works, 
see Maeda, Senjiki. 
34 The time lag for the first sharp increase in suppliers may reflect the fact, as stated 
earlier, that the NAW prepared its internal organization for finding and managing 
suppliers in 1938. 
35 During the war, subcontractors were referred to as “cooperative factories” 
(kyoryoku kojo). suppliers of machinery parts in the list, only 15 disappeared before 1945. Moreover, 
of the 30 suppliers of castings and forgings, only one supplier disappeared before 
1945. As discussed in Section 1, Hirofumi Ueda previously stressed the instability of 
the wartime transaction relationship between assemblers and suppliers.36 This does 
not appear to be the case for the No. 5 Works of MHI. 
Finally, we can view the geographical distribution of suppliers (Table 5, 6). First, 
the distribution of the suppliers was substantially different between special parts 
and machinery parts. Whereas most machinery parts suppliers were located in Aichi 
prefecture, the largest portion of the special parts suppliers were in Tokyo, and only 
20–30% were located in the Aichi prefecture. One reason may be that the government 
was more intensively involved in the production and distribution of special parts. 
Further, it is also possible that only a limited number of firms with relatively high 
technological capabilities could produce special parts. 
Second, over time the regional distribution of suppliers of machinery parts and 
castings and forgings changed, while the distribution of the suppliers of special parts 
was more stable. In terms of machinery parts, the most remarkable changes are the 
declining percentages in 1944. Meanwhile, the percentage of suppliers in Osaka, the 
prefecture in which the second-largest group of machinery parts suppliers was 
located, also declined from 1942. 
As substitutes for Aichi and Osaka, the percentage share of suppliers in Gifu, 
Shizuoka, and Tokyo increased. Overall, the suppliers of machinery parts dispersed 
geographically from 1942. The geographical dispersion of suppliers is even clearer for 
castings and forgings. For example, suppliers in the Aichi prefecture supplied all 
castings and forgings until 1940. Afterwards, the percentage of suppliers in the Aichi 
prefecture declined substantially, while the percentages of suppliers in Tokyo, Osaka, 
Kanagawa, and Shizuoka increased. By 1943, most suppliers of castings and forgings 
were located in prefectures other than Aichi. In sum, with the expansion process of 
No. 5 Works, the parts supply base also expanded, in terms of both the number of 
suppliers and their geographic distribution. 
 
Table 5 here 
Table 6 here 
 
4. Parts supply and aircraft production 
In this section, we examine how the expansion of the supplier networks contributed 
to airframe production at No. 5 Works. The “Factory Survey” included sections that 
explained the reasons why production had fallen short. With respect to the labor 
force, “our labor force expansion plan will not finally be satisfied until the end of the 
war.” Further, “however the fact that the requested labor force was not satisfied did 
not provide actual damage to production.” This was because, “as the expansion of our 
equipment and the production expansion of outside part suppliers did not keep pace 
with the increase in labor force, the labor force was relatively in excess.” It also 
points out that special parts were particularly in short supply among those parts 
supplied by outside suppliers. In sum, the “Factory Survey” recognized that the 
binding constraints of airframe production were equipment and parts supply, 
particularly the supply of special parts. 
We can also examine this observation quantitatively. To start with, the “Factory 
Survey” includes monthly data for No. 5 Works for airframe production, the supply of 
special parts, the supply of machinery parts, and the total hours worked from 1939.37 
Airframe production is shown in Figure 3-A. The decline at the end of 1940 is a result 
of a condition peculiar to No. 5 Works entailing a change in the major type of 
                                                  
36 Ueda, Senjiki, Chapter 6. 
37 Only a diagram concerning the supply of special parts is available. We obtained the 
requisite data from this diagram. airframe manufactured.38 The production of No. 5 Works then increased sharply from 
1941 to 1943, with further accelerations in late 1942 and late 1943. Both these 
accelerations reflect policy measures taken to increase the national level of 
production. Production at No. 5 Works then began to decline in early 1944, some 
months earlier than the decline in the national level of production. Furthermore, 
production declined sharply in December 1944 when Nagoya suffered from bombing 
and a major earthquake. From February 1945, production recovered. In May and 
June 1945, the recovery accelerated but in July 1945, it again declined. 
 
Figures 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C here 
 
Figure 3-B shows the supply of parts. While the supply of both special parts and 
machinery parts increased up until 1943, the supply of machinery parts grew 
relatively faster. In addition, whereas the supply of special parts began to decline 
after April 1944, the supply of machinery parts continued to increase until 
September 1944. However, the supply of machinery parts declined very sharply from 
October 1944, and consequently the index of machinery parts supply fell relative to 
the supply of special parts. 
  The fact that the increase in special parts supply was lower than that of 
machinery parts is consistent with the recognition that special parts were the 
binding constraint of production. The timing of the decline in production and the 
special parts supply supports this view. Meanwhile, in early 1944, machinery parts 
supply was still increasing. Furthermore, the total hours worked also continued to 
increase until the end of 1944 (Figure 3-C). In sum, the mobilization of the labor 
force and the expansion of the supplier network raised the upper limit of airframe 
production at No. 5 Works, and within the upper limit the supply of special parts, 
whose increase was relatively slow, provided the binding constraint. 
However, the situation changed after the end of 1944. When production declined 
sharply in December 1944, the decline in the supply of special parts was moderate. 
In addition, when production recovered from February 1945, the supply of special 
parts did not increase. In contrast, the supply of machinery parts declined sharply in 
December 1944 and temporarily recovered from February 1945. Using these 
observations, we can declare that the binding constraint of production was special 
parts. From the end of 1944 onwards, the supply of machinery parts also became a 
binding constraint. 
We can test this hypothesis using regression analysis. For this purpose, we use 
monthly data on airframe production, special parts supply, machinery parts supply, 
and the total hours worked at No. 5 Works from January 1939 to July 1945. As our 
focus is the change in binding constraints, we use a switching regression technique39. 
Assuming a Cobb–Douglas production function, we estimate the following equation 
system. 
 
LN(Yt1) =β01 +β11LN(SPt) +β21LN(MPt) +β31 (Lt) + et1 
LN(Yt2) =β02 +β12LN(SPt) +β22LN(MPt) +β32 (Lt) + et2 
REGIMEt =β03 +β13(SPt/Lt) +β23(MPt/Lt) + et3 
Yt = Yt1     if REGIMEt < 0 
Yt = Yt2     if REGIMEt ≥ 0 
 
where Yt is airframe production in month t, SPt is the special part supply in month t, 
MPt is the machinery parts supply in month t, Lt is the total hours worked in month 
t, Regimet is a latent variable determining which regression regime the dependent 
                                                  
38 “Factory Survey.” 
39 Concerning a switching regression model, see Zimmerman, “Switching 
Regressions.”  variable is from, and eti is a normally distributed error term. 
Table 7 provides the estimation results. Column (1) provides the simple OLS 
estimation results. The coefficient for special parts supply is positive, large, and 
statistically significant, while the coefficient for machinery parts supply is negative 
and statistically insignificant. However, the coefficient for total hours worked is 
positive and statistically significant. Column (2)-1, 2, 3 provide the estimates using 
the switching regression model. As shown, in Regime 1, the coefficient of special 
parts supply is positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients of 
machinery parts supply and total hours worked have the wrong sign. In contrast, in 
Regime 2, the coefficient of machinery parts supply is positive and statistically 
significant, while the coefficients of the other two variables are statistically 
insignificant. Given these features of the two regimes, the timing of the regime 
switch is especially of interest. Figure 4 shows the estimated probability that Yt was 
in Regime 2, where (1-the probability of Regime 2) equals to the probability of 
Regime 1. As shown, for most of the period of the war, Yt is inferred to be in Regime 1, 
but by the end of 1944, Yt has shifted to Regime 2. 
 
Table 7 here 
Figure 4 here 
 
These estimation results are consistent with our observation from Figures 3-A, 
3-B, and 3-C. That is, the special parts supply was the binding constraint for 
airframe production for most of the period before the final phase of the war, while in 
the final phase of the war, machinery parts supply came to be the binding constraint. 
Meanwhile, as the “Factory Survey” suggests, labor supply was not binding 
throughout the war period. Put differently, until the end of 1944, airframe production 
at the NAW increased as the upper limit bounded by the special parts supply 
increased, and from the end of 1944 (when strategic bombing and an earthquake 
destroyed the networks for machinery parts supply), airframe production at the NAW 
collapsed. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The rapid growth of the Japanese aircraft industry during World War II has 
attracted the interest of many researchers since immediately after the end of the war. 
In this paper, we explored the basis for this growth by focusing on the No. 5 Works of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co. Our findings indicate that the supply of basic inputs 
increased sharply and that the labor force, once effectively mobilized, was not a 
binding constraint on production. The supply of machinery parts from medium and 
small-sized suppliers was also not a binding constraint, at least until the final phase 
of the war. In fact, the binding constraint on aircraft production was the supply of 
special parts from large firms. Put differently, the expansion of production at No. 5 
Works took place with increase in the supply of special parts. In turn, the increase in 
the supply of special parts and the more rapid increase in the supply of machinery 
parts supply were achieved thorough the expansion of the supplier network, in terms 
of both the number of suppliers and the geographical area where they were located. 
In this sense, extensive division of works between firms was a basis for rapid 
expansion of the Japanese aircraft industry during the World War II. However, from 
early 1944, the decline in the supply of parts caused a decline in aircraft production. 
That is, airframe production began to fall because of the decline in special parts 
supply from early 1944, finally destroyed by a sharp decline in the supply of 
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1998): 30-33  Table 1 Estimated Share of the Aircraft industry in the Machinery Industry in Terms of Production Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Airframe production Engine production Airframe +engine Machinery production(5)/(6)
Number of aircrafts1,000 yen Number of engines 1,000 yen 1,000 yen 1,000 yen %
1927 3,556 567,739 0.6
1932 49,425 553,645 8.9
1941 5,088 512,517 12,151 371,369 883,887 10,793,565 8.2
1942 8,861 934,319 16,999 506,061 1,440,380 10,332,396 13.9
1943 16,693 2,433,735 28,541 787,809 3,221,544 11,354,661 28.4
1944 28,180 3,370,113 46,526 1,629,875 4,999,987 14,744,586 33.9
Note: (1): USSBS, "Final Reports," p.155.
        (2): (1) ｔｉｍｅｓ unit price of airframe calicurated from "Materials for the Corporate History of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co.."
            (held at the Headquarters of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co.)
        (3): USSBS, "Final Reports," p.155.
        (4): (3) times unit price of engine calicurated from "Materials for the Corporate History of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries."
        (5): The data on 1927 and 1932 are taken from MITI, Kogyo Tokei, and the data from 1941 to 1944 are calicurated by (2)+(4).
        (6): The data from 1927 to 1942 are taken from MITI Kogyo Tokei.　The data on 1943 and 1944 are estimated by the data on 1942,
             production index of machinery industry and price index of metal and machinery industry.　Production index and price index 
              are taken from Toyo Keizai Shinposha, Kanketsu.Table 2 Orders and Production of Airframe at NAW
(1)Orders (2)Production (1)/(2) (%)
Total Army Navy Total Army Navy Average Army Navy
1922 122 30 92 122 30 92 100.0 100.0 100.0
1923 98 32 66 98 32 66 100.0 100.0 100.0
1924 97 40 57 97 40 57 100.0 100.0 100.0
1925 97 36 61 97 36 61 100.0 100.0 100.0
1926 116 51 65 116 51 65 100.0 100.0 100.0
1927 101 36 65 90 27 63 89.1 75.0 96.9
1928 74 25 49 74 25 49 100.0 100.0 100.0
1929 82 9 73 82 9 73 100.0 100.0 100.0
1930 67 5 62 67 5 62 100.0 100.0 100.0
1931 67 7 60 67 7 60 100.0 100.0 100.0
1932 181 80 101 181 80 101 100.0 100.0 100.0
1933 191 95 96 191 95 96 100.0 100.0 100.0
1934 221 76 145 221 76 145 100.0 100.0 100.0
1935 199 75 124 191 72 119 96.0 96.0 96.0
1936 111 46 65 104 43 61 93.7 93.5 93.8
1937 418 163 255 322 74 248 77.0 45.4 97.3
1938 1,125 561 564 914 350 564 81.2 62.4 100.0
1939 1,096 601 495 1,194 663 531 108.9 110.3 107.3
1940 1,741 982 759 1,147 627 520 65.9 63.8 68.5
1941 2,038 1,135 903 1,697 800 897 83.3 70.5 99.3
1942 3,287 1,337 1,950 2,514 1,170 1,344 76.5 87.5 68.9
1943 3,656 1,736 1,920 3,864 1,860 2,004 105.7 107.1 104.4
1944 10,259 4,309 5,950 3,628 1,210 2,418 35.4 28.1 40.6
1945 1,450 569 881 563 282 281 38.8 49.6 31.9
Source："Mitsubishi Kokuki Ryakushi,"pp.23483-23485、pp.23492-23493、pp.23502-23503 (held at the Headquarters of












1920 3,464 43 61 0 n.a.
1921 4,884 117 921 0 n.a.
1922 5,577 137 1,491 0 n.a.
1923 7,014 145 1,250 0 n.a.
1924 7,401 150 1,285 0 n.a.
1925 8,229 164 1,411 0 n.a.
1926 8,584 175 1,515 0 n.a.
1927 8,919 197 1,583 0 n.a.
1928 9,497 214 1,766 0 n.a.
1929 11,236 211 1,726 0 n.a.
1930 11,312 218 2,337 0 n.a.
1931 12,367 258 2,505 0 n.a.
1932 15,932 296 4,936 0 n.a.
1933 21,799 360 5,994 0 n.a.
1934 23,926 411 6,134 0 n.a.
1935 26,068 444 6,177 0 n.a.
1936 29,684 504 7,155 0 202
1937 33,471 736 12,695 0 n.a.
1938 63,100 810 17,314 0 572
1939 96,415 1,254 21,276 0 1,221
1940 115,500 1,664 25,985 0 1,644
1941 136,387 2,485 34,415 700 1,771
1942 166,400 3,835 57,592 8,845 2,600
1943 207,880 4,779 84,731 22,870 3,208
1944 200,000 7,172 92,244 23,368 3,800
Source:(1) "Nagoya Kokuki Seisakujo Gaishi"; (2)"Kojo Genkyo Hokoku," November 1938; (3)"Genkyo Hokoku" April 1941,
           December 1941, December 1942, March 1943, April 1944; (4)"Kojo genkyo Hokoku Hojo Enkaku Nenpyo,"
          April 1940; (5)"Genkyo Shinkokusho, March 1943; (6)MHI, Mitsubishi, p.298.  (1) is held at the headquarters of MHI, and
          (2)-(5) are held at the Archives of NAW.
Note: 1 tsubo equals to 3.3 m
2.Table 4 Increase of Suppliers for No5 Works of NAW
Number of suppliers
Special parts Machinery parts Forgings and castings
1937 0 2 2
1938 0 4 4
1939 38 42 6
1940 49 44 6
1941 52 42 7
1942 55 50 10
1943 64 74 24
1944 74 101 29
1945 70 101 29
Source: "Factory Survey."Table 5 Geographcal Distribution of Suppliers for No5. Works of NAW
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Special Parts Aichi 0 0 10 14 16 17 19 20 20
　 N a g o y a 0 01 01 41 61 71 92 02 0
Gofu 000000111
Shizuoka 000000001
M i e 001111113







Machinery parts Aichi 1 3 22 23 25 30 45 51 55
　 N a g o y a 0289 1 0 1 4 2 2 2 4 2 5
　 T h e   o t h e r s 1 11 41 41 51 62 32 73 0
Gifu 001111689
Shizuoka 001113699












Forgings and castingsAichi 246667 1 2 1 3 1 3
　 N a g o y a 235555899









Source: "Factory Survey."Table 6 Geographcal Distribution of Suppliers for No5. Works of NAW (Percentage)
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Special PaAichi 26.3 28.6 30.8 30.9 29.7 27.0 28.6
　Nagoya 26.3 28.6 30.8 30.9 29.7 27.0 28.6
Gofu 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.4 1.4
Shizuoka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Mie 2.6 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 4.3
Tokyo 50.0 49.0 46.2 45.5 43.8 43.2 37.1
Kanagawa 7.9 6.1 9.6 9.1 9.4 9.5 8.6
Saitama 0.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4
Osaka 7.9 6.1 3.8 3.6 4.7 6.8 7.1
Hyogo 5.3 4.1 3.8 5.5 6.3 6.8 7.1
Fukuoka 0.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.4
Unknown 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.4
Machinery Aichi 52.4 52.3 59.5 60.0 60.8 50.5 54.5
　Nagoya 19.0 20.5 23.8 28.0 29.7 23.8 24.8
　The others 33.3 31.8 35.7 32.0 31.1 26.7 29.7
Gifu 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 8.1 7.9 8.9
Shizuoka 2.4 2.3 2.4 6.0 8.1 8.9 8.9
Mie 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 4.0
Tokyo 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.4 5.0 4.0
Kanagawa 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.0 2.7 3.0 3.0
Saitama 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.0
Osaka 16.7 15.9 16.7 14.0 9.5 10.9 10.9
Hyogo 4.8 6.8 4.8 4.0 2.7 2.0 2.0
Kyoto 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.0 1.0
Nara 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Fukuoka 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.0
Ishikawa 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.4 2.0 0.0
Nagano 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.0
Unknown 7.1 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0
Forgings a Aichi 100.0 100.0 85.7 70.0 50.0 44.8 44.8
　Nagoya 83.3 83.3 71.4 50.0 33.3 31.0 31.0
　The others 16.7 16.7 14.3 20.0 16.7 13.8 13.8
Shizuoka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3.4 3.4
Tokyo 0.0 0.0 14.3 20.0 12.5 10.3 10.3
Kanagawa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 10.3 10.3
Chiba 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.4
Osaka 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 17.2 17.2
Nagano 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 3.4 3.4
Yamagushi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 3.4
Fukuoka 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 4.2 3.4 3.4
Source: "Factory Survey."Table 7 Determinants of Airframe Production
(1) (2)-1 (2)-2 (2)-3
Dependent variable: LN(Yt) OLS Switching regression
Regime 1 Regime 2 Classification equation
LN(SPt) 0.841 *** 1.799 *** -0.039 2.569 ***
(5.42) (14.70) (-0.35) (6.46)
LN(MPt) -0.047 -0.153 0.776 *** -1.139 ***
(-0.68) (-1.92) * (18.35) (-6.48)
LN(Lt) 0.463 *** -0.829 0.005 -1.956 ***
(3.53) (-7.28) (0.05) (-5.83)
Const. -1.304 *** 0.663 *** 0.754 *** 3.588
(-3.93) (2.99) (3.05) (4.22)




Note: t-values in parentheses.
　　　  ***： Statistically significant at 1% level.
　　　  **  ： Statistically significant at 5% level.
　　　  *   ： Statistically significant at 10% level.